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Abstract 
With the help of a peculiar institutional feature of early Romanian privatization, 
when a group of firms was explicitly banned to become private, we test which factors 
contributed to the selection of firms into long-term state ownership. We find that 
politicians sheltered large and inefficient firms from privatization, which paid low 
wages and had high overdue payments. These results are consistent with 
minimization of employment losses, even if efficiency enhancement of privatization 
or revenue maximization had to be sacrificed. We hypothesize that this behavior was 
induced by the unfavorable economic conditions in Romania which brought about 
large employment losses during the first several years of economic transition.  
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    Hosszú távú állami tulajdon vagy magánosítás?
 
       Vállalatok politikai szelekciója Romániában
 
 
                 
 







A romániai állami vállalatok egy részét a privatizáció kezdete előtt az állami 
döntéshozók kivonták a privatizálható vállalatok köréből. Azt vizsgáljuk, hogy milyen 
vállalati ismérvek alapján tartották e vállalatokat hosszú távon is állami tulajdonban. 
Elemzésünk szerint a politikusok leginkább a nagy méretű, rossz hatékonysággal 
működő vállalatokat sorolták ebben a csoportba. Ezek alacsony béreket fizettek és sok 
esetben komoly elmaradásaik voltak tartozásaik, valamint adóik kifizetésében. 
Eredményeink arra engednek következtetni, hogy a politikusok elsősorban a 
munkahelyek elvesztését próbálták korlátozni még akkor is, ha ennek ára a rossz 
hatékonyságú vállalatok megtartása volt. E mögött az a megfontolás állhatott, hogy 
Romániában az átmenet első időszakában a foglalkoztatottak száma jelentős 
mértékben csökkent; ezért a döntéshozók racionálisan dönthettek úgy, hogy nem 
erősítik ezt a folyamatot a privatizáció vélt vagy valós negatív munkapiaci hatásaival. 
 
 
Tárgyszavak: privatizáció, kormányzati célok, Románia 
 
JEL: L33, P26  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Privatization, one of the most important policies that shaped the economic landscape of many 
countries in the last three decades, has always been a highly politicized process (Kay and 
Thompson, 1986) and in the last several years a number of studies were published that 
analyzed the factors that induce or hamper the selection of firms into privatization programs or 
the sequencing of firms in privatization.1  In this paper we study this process in Romania, and 
we argue that the country has several features that make such an analysis potentially very 
useful.  First, the firm-level dataset we use in this analysis contains the whole population of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in 1992, before the privatization of medium and large 
corporations actually started.  Second, the institutional setting of the early Romanian 
privatization was such that it allows us the clearly distinguish firms that were, from those 
which were not included in privatization programs, even if those from the first group were not 
privatized.  In 1990-91, before the privatization process actually started, the Romanian 
government explicitly prohibited the privatization of a group of firms, and the transfer of 
ownership from state to private hands of these companies was allowed only seven years later at 
the end of 1997, after the party governing between 1990 and 1996 lost the elections.  These 
firms were given a special legal form (called regii autonome in Romanian).  We observe legal 
form in our data, hence we can distinguish privatizable firms from those kept in long-term 
state ownership even if both remained in state ownership.  This empirical setting presents a 
clear advantage to the situation when the intentions of the decision makers are tested by 
comparing actually privatized and not privatized firms, as the state-owned group may contain 
firms that the government intended to privatize, but for some reason the transfer of ownership 
did not happen.  The importance of this distinction is confirmed by our data, as only 30 
percent of the privatizable firms had been actually privatized by 1996, the end of the first 
political cycle. 
The other advantage of the Romanian institutional setting is that the law regulating the 
categorization of firms into privatizable and non-privatizable groups was rather vague, leaving 
the decision makers latitude to pursue their own objectives.  The stated intention behind the 
prohibition of privatization for certain firms was to keep the so-called strategic firms under 
state control, but the law neither specified which industries were deemed to be strategic, nor 
did it restrict the action of the law over strategic industries: “…(non-privatizable firms) are 
                                                        
1 Studies using firm-level data to test the selection of firms into privatization programs include Guo 
and Yao (2005) and Liu et al. (2007) in China, and Dinc and Gupta (2009) in India.  Szentpeteri and 
Telegdy (2009) study the same question in Romania by estimating the effect of privatization from 
real data and constructing a counterfactual effect of non-privatizable firms.  De Fraja and Roberts 
(2009) and Gupta et al. (2008) study factors that explain sequencing of privatization in Poland and 
the Czech Republic, respectively. 
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organized and operate within the economy's strategic branches…as well as in other fields of 
activity established by the Government” (Law 15/1990 on State Enterprise Reorganization, Art. 
2).  This formulation left the decision makers rather unconstrained in making privatization 
decisions in a sovereign way. 
In addition to the institutional setting of early privatization, the Romanian economic 
environment also differs from other countries – China, the Czech Republic and Poland – where 
the political selection into privatization or the sequencing of privatization has been analyzed.  
B e t w e e n  1 99 1  a n d  1 9 9 6  e m p l o y m e n t  f e l l  b y  1 3  p e r c e n t  in  R o m a n i a ,  a n d  t h i s  l a r g e  d e c l i n e  
probably made politicians sensitive to expected employment declines after privatization 
(National Commission for Statistics, 1997).2  Indeed, our results support that politicians 
responded to the challenges of the economic environment as – unlike other studies – we find 
that large, inefficient companies, which were more likely to shed employment as a consequence 
of firm restructuring, were kept under state control for an indefinite time.  Under the 
assumption that privatization has the largest efficiency enhancing effect on firms with low pre-
privatization efficiency, this also means that the Romanian decision makers did not care much 
about this positive feature of privatization.  The other findings of the paper show that firms 
with low wages and large overdue payments were also more likely to be sheltered from 
privatization, although these results are not so robust across different specifications. 
In the next section we discuss the data and the estimation methodology. In Section 3 we 
present the results and the last section concludes. 
 
2. DATA 
The main data source of this analysis is the Romanian Ministry of Finance balance sheet data, 
which provide information on financial variables and employment for all SOEs in 1992 and for 
overdue payments and the value of bad loans for 1993.  Privatizations barely started in 1992, so 
these are also pre-privatization data for most of the firms.3  Industry code at the 3-digit level 
and legal form are drawn from the Romanian Enterprise Registry. We use the legal form to 
distinguish privatizable and non-privatizable firms. 
                                                        
2 While the positive effects of privatization on firm performance in Central and Eastern Europe are well 
established (Djankov and Murell, 2002; Brown et al., 2006; Estrin et al., 2009), the employment 
effects have been much less analyzed and the results are not so conclusive (e.g., Brown et al., 
forthcoming). Nevertheless, theoretical work predicted large declines in employment (Boyco et al., 
1996), and anecdotal evidence also suggest fears from employment declines.  In Sri Lanka, for 
example, a presidential decree was issued stating that workers in privatized companies should not 
lose their jobs (Knight-John and Athukorala, 2005).  Megginson (2005) states more generally that 
“(all) governments fear lay-offs resulting from privatization” (p. 389).   
3 In our sample there are only 10 firms that were privatized, all of them during the last two months of 
the year. 
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From the population of SOEs we selected those 3-digit industries by the NACE 
classification which contain at least one non-privatizable firm.  Appendix Table 1 shows that 
there are 47 such industries, containing 348 non-privatizable firms.  Some of these industries 
are typically considered of strategic importance, and have been traditionally state-owned in 
many countries.  These include different mining activities, the railway, the post, and a radio 
communication firm that deals with the distribution of frequencies.  These industries contain 
very few firms, many times only one and these are not privatizable.  Other industries can also 
be considered of strategic importance, such as the energy sector and water distribution, 
sewage, and land transportation.  Many firms belonging to them are non-privatizable, but 
there is also a large number of privatizable firms in these industries.  A third category consists 
of those industries in which state ownership does not seem to be important, at least not for 
strategic reasons.  Examples can be brought from agriculture, tobacco, constructions, retail, 
hotels, real estate and many others. 
To perform the regression analysis, we restrict the sample to have more comparable firms 
across the privatizable and non-privatizable groups.  Agriculture is dropped from the analysis 
as the number of non-privatizable firms is a very small proportion of all firms.  We drop those 
industries in which only non-privatizable firms exist.  The final sample consists of 2,019 firms, 
out of which 287 are non-privatizable and 1,732 privatizable.  When total assets are used in the 
construction of the performance measure, the sample shrinks by 178 firms (248 non-
privatizable and 1,593 privatizable). 
 
3. POLITICAL OBJECTIVES IN PRIVATIZATION PROGRAMS 
Economic theory recommends privatization as a tool to depoliticize state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and to provide incentives to restructure them (e.g., Kornai, 1992), but the designers of 
privatization programs may have different objectives.  Socially sensitive politicians may be 
more concerned about the current employment of the firm than its future efficiency, especially 
if they share the widespread belief that privatization results in layoffs.  To create political 
support, self-interested politicians may also be inclined to keep excess employment in firms 
which are under their control and hamper the privatization of those firms in which subsequent 
restructuring will result in job losses (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994).  Politicians may also be 
concerned about balancing the state budget (Bortolotti et al., 2003) or care for their own 
wealth and political career by collecting bribes and political support received from investors in 
exchange for a low price of the privatizable companies (López-de-Silanes et al., 1997).  Finally, 
the need to attract investors and public support for future reforms may also be major factors 
among the objectives of politicians (Dewatripont and Roland, 1995). 
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We can test several of these objectives with the help of our data.  Following Guo and Yao 
(2005) and Gupta et al. (2008), we assume that privatization can boost more effectively the 
efficiency of those SOEs which are relatively inefficient pre-privatization.  Employment 
concerns of politicians are also captured partially by firm efficiency: already efficient firms are 
less likely to shed labor after privatization.  In addition, selection by employment size may also 
indicate employment concerns, as larger firms may lose larger amounts of labor than smaller 
ones during restructuring.  As well as employment, wages can also influence privatization 
decisions.  If the government expects that wages will fall after privatization, this may also 
decline their chances of reelection.  Privatization revenues may also play a role in privatization 
decisions, as they help governments to ease the burden on the state budget.  As we do not 
observe privatization revenues in the data we proxy them with firm size and firm efficiency:  
ceteris paribus, large and efficient firms are more valuable than small and non-profitable ones.  
Privatization, however, can also have an indirect effect on the state budget through higher tax 
revenues, if privatization increases profits, and by lower transfers to loss making SOEs. We 
proxy transfers by looking at the existence of soft budget constraints (SBCs) at the firm level.  
Finally, reputation concerns would also induce politicians to privatize efficient firms first.  To 
test whether bribe collection was an important factor in privatization decisions, we should 
know privatization prices and contrast them with some estimated value of the firm.  Such data 
unfortunately do not exist, but we argue that bribe taking was probably not a major 
consideration in the early Romanian privatization.  During the first political cycle most of the 
firms were privatized by the Management Employee Buyout method, in which an organization 
established by the management and the employees of the firm had the right of first refusal in 
most of the cases, and the loan taken from the government to pay for the shares had always 
n e g a t i v e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .   I f  politicians foresaw this when selecting firms into privatization 
programs, they were also aware that it will not be likely to collect bribes (at least to a lesser 
extent than in the case when privatization favored outside investors).  This argument also 
applies to privatization revenues: since privatization brought very little revenues, we can rule 
out the possibility that privatization prices were a major concern for politicians, at least in the 
early phase of the Romanian privatization.4 
We use three measures for firm efficiency:  return on assets (ROA), return on sales (ROS) 
and the unit cost of production (UC) (the exact definitions of the variables are provided in 
Table 1).  All three performance proxies show that privatizable firms were more efficient than 
non-privatizable ones.  ROA is 1.1 percent for the average non-privatizable, and 4.5 percent for 
the privatizable firm.  Average ROS is 0 in non-privatizable, and 4.5 in the privatizable group, 
and UC is slightly larger than 1 for the non-privatizable and 0.935 for the privatizable firms.  
                                                        
4 On the Romanian MEBO privatization see Earle and Telegdy (2002).  Szentpeteri and Telegdy (2009) 
discuss the relative importance of different factors in the selection of firms into privatization in 
Romania. 
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The mean difference among the two groups of firms is statistically highly significant for all 
three variables, as shown in Column 3 of the table.  Non-privatizable firms were much larger 
than those which were not sheltered from ownership change.  The average employment size 
was 1,079 for the non-privatizable firms, almost four times more than privatizable firms’ 
average employment of 404 (the mean difference between the two groups is statistically 
significant).  The two groups also differ by average wages, as this variable was higher by 9 
percent in privatizable firms than in firms kept in long-term state ownership (the mean 
difference, however, is significant only at the 10-percent level).  Our first indicator of SBCs is 
the proportion of overdue payments in the value of sales (overdue payments include payments 
to suppliers, creditors as well as tax payments). Overdue payments are larger in non-
privatizable firms, where on average it amounted to almost 11 percent of the value of sales, 
while it was 7 percent for the other group.5  The other SBC indicator, the proportion of bad 
loans taken over by the government were, on the contrary, larger in the privatizable group (5.7 
and 3.6, respectively).6  The comparison of means across the two types of firms therefore 
suggests that Romanian politicians were inclined to privatize relatively small and profitable 
firms, which paid high wages, had a smaller proportion of overdue payments, but a larger 
proportion of bad loans. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL SETTING AND RESULTS 
To perform the multivariate analysis, we follow the literature and estimate probit regressions, 
where the dependent variable equals 1 if the firm was kept in long-term state ownership and 0 
if not, and the regressors include employment, performance, wages and the two indicators of 
SBCs (employment and wages, the two variables that do not present proportional differences 
across firms, are in logarithms).  We control for the chance that selection was partially done on 
the basis of strategic industries in two ways.  First, we include a dummy variable indicating 
that the firm is from a strategic industry and the estimation equation is the following:7   
 
LONGSTATEi = α1 + α2EFFi + α3logEMPi + α4logWAGEi + 
α5OVERDUEi + α6BADLOANi + α7STRATEGICi  + εi 
                                                        
5 Overdue payments are zero for 675 firms, out of which 69 are non-privatizable and 606 privatizable.  
The average overdue payment for those firms where this variable is positive is 14 and 11 percent, 
respectively. 
6 These variables are available only for 1993, so they can be contaminated by privatization effects.  
When we exclude them from the regressions the coefficients of the other variables do not change 
qualitatively. 
7 We use a very broad definition of strategic industries, which include the following industries (by the 
NACE code):  101, 102, 111, 132, 145, 221, 401, 402, 403, 410, 601, 602, 632, 641, 643, 644, 731, 900, 
921.  By this definition half of all firms and 83 percent of non-privatizable firms operate in strategic 
industries. 
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As the grouping of industries into strategic and not strategic is somewhat ad hoc, in a 
second specification we replace this dummy with a full set of 3-digit industry controls.  With 
the disaggregated set of dummies we control better for industry effects, but the results are 
potentially unstable as we have industries with very few companies. 
The marginal effect of the probit estimates, presented in Table 2, confirm the results 
obtained from the univariate analysis.  The estimated marginal effects show that pre-
privatization ROA and ROS have a negative effect on the probability of selection in long-term 
state ownership.  UC, which is a measure of inefficiency, has a positive effect.  Employment size 
is estimated to have a positive effect on the chance of being kept under state control.  The 
efficiency and employment effect is very robust to controls for industry (strategic or a full 
control of three digit industries).  Higher wages have a negative significant effect when a 
strategic dummy is included in the specification, but the magnitude of the coefficient drops 
when we control with a full set of industry dummies and it also becomes statistically 
insignificant.  Overdue payments have a positive and significant estimated marginal effect 
when we control for strategic industries, but this effect vanishes (and it becomes negative) 
when the strategic dummy is replaced with a full set of industry controls.  Bad loans seem not 
to have any effect on the selection of firms into long-term state ownership.8  The dummy 
variable indicating whether the company is in a strategic industry always has a positive, 
significant coefficient. 
Our results therefore show that Romanian decision makers kept in long-term state 
ownership large and inefficient firms, which pay low wages but have large overdue payments 
(the last two results are lost when detailed industry controls are added).  Keeping inefficient 
firms under state control is consistent with the hypothesis of employment and reputation 
concerns, and inconsistent with efficiency increase and maximization of privatization 
revenues.9  The selection by employment size also indicates the importance of employment 
concerns, and provides counterevidence for revenue collection.  Keeping low wage firms under 
state control may also show that politicians were concerned with deterioration of worker well-
being after privatization, especially if low wages are a proxy for the quality of employees.  Low-
skilled employees faced a greater threat of replacement and also had hard time finding a new 
job.  Finally, keeping firms which have large overdue payments also shows that balancing the 
state budget was not a high priority in the privatization process.  In conclusion, our results 
provide evidence that politicians were primarily concerned with employment deterioration, 
and they did that even if its price was forgone efficiency enhancement of SOEs. 
                                                        
8 It is possible that this result is driven by positive correlations between the two SBC measures.  We 
rerun the regression without including overdue payments, but the estimated coefficients on bad loans 
did not change. 
9 Reputation concerns, however, are not likely to have played an important role in the early Romanian 
privatization, as the process unfolded very slowly in the first several years.  According to our data, 
only about one-quarter of firms was majority privatized by 1995. 
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The estimated effects of pre-privatization characteristics on the probability of being slated 
for long-term state ownership are sizable.  As Table 3 shows, the firm at the 10th percentile in 
the distribution of ROA has a chance of 6 or 11 percent to be in the non-privatizable group, 
while the firm at the 90th percentile has a chance of only 9 to 4 percent (all the other variables 
are set at their means).  We estimate similar effects for the other proxies of efficiency.  These 
effects are not large, but neither negligible if compared to the observed probability of being in 
the non-privatizable group, which is 13-14 percent.  The employment effect is much larger:  the 
probability of being in long-term state ownership of the firm with employment size at the 10th 
percentile of the employment distribution varies between 2 and 6 percent, depending on the 
specification.  This probability is between 11 and 16 percent for the firm at the 90th percentile of 
the employment distribution, the difference between the two probabilities being between 8.8 
and 12.9 percentage points.  When wages are set to the 10th percentile of the wage distribution 
and we control only for strategic industries, the probability to be in the non-privatizable group 
is 12-13 percent, and at the 90th percentile of the distribution it declines to 7-8 percent.  This 
represents a fall of 5 percentage points in the probability to be selected for long-term state 
ownership.10 
How do our results compare to findings from other studies?  Pre-selection firm efficiency 
increases the probability to be in the first wave of mass privatization in the Czech  Republic 
(Gupta et al., 2008), but Dinc and Gupta (2009) do not find any correlation between efficiency 
and selection into privatization in India, nor the two studies using Chinese data find such 
effects (Guo and Yao, 2005; Liu et al., 2007).  Contrary to our results, both Dinc and Gupta 
(2009) and De Fraja and Roberts (2009) find that large firms are more likely to be privatized 
in India and Poland, although the Polish data contains only the largest firms.  Gupta et al. 
(2008) test the employment concerns of politicians by including industry-level employment 
growth in the regressions and do not find any effect.  Guo and Yao (2009) test the effects of 
SBCs, and do not find any significant effects on privatization.  Regarding wages, they have a 
negative effect on privatization in India and China (Dinc and Gupta, 2009; Liu et al., 2007) 
w h i l e  w e  f i n d  t h a t  f i r m s  w i t h  s m a l l  w a g e s  a r e  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  r e m a i n  i n  s t a t e  o w n e r s h i p .    
Finally, Szentpeteri and Telegdy (2009) study Romania by taking advantage of the information 
on actual privatizations and simulating the possible effects on employment, efficiency and 
wages, and find similar results to those presented in this paper. 
 
 
                                                        
10 We do not carry out such analysis with overdue payments, as it is equal to zero for 35 percent of the 
sample.  If overdue payments are equal to zero, the probability of being selected in long-term state 
ownership is 8.2-9.4 percent, which is 2-3 percentage points smaller than if overdue payments are set 
at their value at the 90th percentile of the sample (in regressions where we control for strategic 
industry). 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we analyzed several firm characteristics that could contribute to the political 
selection of firms in long-term state ownership.  W e  f i n d  s t r o n g  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  p o l i t i c i a n s  
hampered the privatization of large, inefficient companies.  We also find that low wages and 
large levels of overdue payments increased the likelihood of being sheltered from privatization, 
albeit these results depend on the specification.  In conclusion, the main interest of the 
Romanian politicians was to keep those firms away from privatization which were likely to 
have large employment losses as a result of post-privatization restructuring.  It is probable that 
the unfavorable economic conditions and large expected employment declines did influence 
politicians’ objectives by increasing the social and political costs of layoffs, and politicians 
responded to these costs by keeping control in those firms which were most susceptible to such 
outcomes, even at the cost of forgone efficiency increases. 
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Non-Privatizable and Privatizable Firm Characteristics 
 
Name of variable  Definition of variable  Non-
privatizable  Privatizable  Mean 
difference 
0.011 0.053  -0.042*** 
Return on Assets 
(ROA) 
Net income over value 
of total assets  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.010) 
-0.000 0.045  -0.045*** 
Return on Sales 
(ROS) 
Net income over value 
of sales 
(0.016) (0.002) (0.009) 
1.003 0.935 0.068*** 
Unit Cost (UC)  Total costs over value 
of sales 
(0.021) (0.004) (0.013) 
1,078.7 403.1  675.6*** 
Employment Average  number  of 
employees 
(225.2) (22.4)  (106.8) 
288.3 316.0 -27.8* 
Wage Wage  bill  over 
employment 
(13.5) (5.6)  (14.8) 
0.107 0.071 0.036*** 
Payments overdue  Overdue payments 
(suppliers, creditors, 
tax payments) over 
sales 
(0.009) (0.004) (0.010) 
3.601 5.771  -2.164 
Bad loans  Bad loans taken over by 
the government over 
sales  (0.050) (2.257) (5.544) 
Notes:  Number of non-privatizable firms:  287 (248 for ROA and ROS).  Number of privatizable firms:  1,732 
(1,593 for ROA and ROS).  Mean difference represents the difference between the average value of non-
privatizable and privatizable firms.  Standard errors in parentheses.  *** = significant at the 1-percent level; ** = 
significant at the 5-percent level; * = significant at the 10-percent level. 
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Table 2   
Determinants of Selection into Long-Term State Ownership 
 
Variable  1 2 3 4 5 6 
ROA  -0.132*  -0.177***      
  (0.078)  (0.049)      
ROS     -0.190***  -0.178**    
     (0.068) (0.079)    
UC       0.081*** 0.047* 
       (0.036)  (0.025) 
Employment  0.030***  0.026***  0.031***  0.029***   0.031***   0.033*** 
 (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) 
Wage -0.070***  -0.009  -0.065*** -0.007  -0.049*** -0.007 
 (0.020)  (0.014)  (0.020)  (0.015) (0.018) (0.014) 
Payments 
overdue  0.122** -0.056  0.165***  -0.035  0.137***  -0.028 
  (0.061) (0.037) (0.056) (0.042) (0.027) (0.014) 
Bad loans  -0.021  -0.003  -0.022  -0.004  -0.014  -0.001 
  (0.018) (0.004) (0.018) (0.004) (0.009) (0.003) 
Strategic  0.154***   0.156***   0.140***  
  (0.015)   (0.015)   (0.034)  
Industry  controls  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observed  prob.  0.135 0.135 0.135 0.135 0.142 0.142 
Pseudo R2  0.117 0.441 0.123 0.447  0.148  0.452 
N  1,841 1,841 1,841 1,841 2,019 2,019 
Note:  The coefficients are marginal effects from probit estimations (robust standard errors in parentheses).  Dependent 
variable = 1 if the firm is not privatizable.  Employment and wages are in log form.  The exact definition of variables is 
provided in Table 1.  *** = significant at the 1-percent level; ** = significant at the 5-percent level; * = significant at the 10-
percent level. 
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Table 3 
  Variation of the Probability of Selection into Long-Term State Ownership  
by Firm Characteristics 
 
Variable  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Performance ROA  ROS  Unit  Cost 
10th percentile  0.110  0.063 0.111  0.063 0.081 0.049 
90th percentile  0.092  0.041  0.089  0.043  0.102  0.062 
Difference -0.018  -0.022  -0.022  -0.020  0.021  0.013 
Employment        
10th percentile  0.061  0.022  0.059  0.021  0.052  0.022 
90th percentile  0.157  0.108  0.159 0.115 0.149 0.117 
Difference  0.096 0.086 0.100 0.094 0.097 0.095 
W a g e         
10th percentile  0.133  0.058  0.130  0.059  0.120  0.062 
90th percentile  0.080  0.051  0.081  0.053  0.071  0.052 
Difference -0.053  -0.007  -0.049  -0.006  -0.049  -0.01 
Observed  probability  0.135 0.135 0.135 0.135 0.142 0.142 
Note:  The coefficients represent the probability of being selected in long-term state ownership when the variable 
is set at value of the 10th or the 90th percentile of the distribution, and the other variables are set at their means.  
The regression specifications are the same as in Table 2. 
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 Table A1 
 Industrial Distribution of Non-Privatizable and  
Privatizable State-Owned Enterprises 
 
NACE 






11  Growing of crops; market gardening; horticulture  2 443 
12  Farming of animals  1 191 
13  Mixed farming  2 177 
14  Agric. and animal husbandry service activities exc. vet. act. landscape gardening  1 547 
21  Forestry and logging  1 1 
22  Forestry and logging related service activities  1 6 
101  Mining and agglomeration of hard coal  1 0 
102  Mining and agglomeration of lignite  1 0 
111  Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas  1 0 
132  Mining of non-ferrous metal ores, except uranium and thorium ores  2 0 
144  Production of salt  1 0 
145  Other mining and quarrying  1 5 
160  Manufacture of tobacco products  1 0 
201  Sawmilling and planing of wood; impregnation of wood  2 20 
221  Publishing  1 56 
222  Printing and service activities related to printing  5 26 
244  Manuf. of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals and botanical products  1 13 
246  Manufacture of other chemical products  1 13 
362  Manufacture of jewelry and related articles  1 1 
401  Production and distribution of electricity  1 1 
402  Manufacture of gas; distribution of gaseous fuels through mains  1 2 
403  Steam and hot water supply  84 40 
410  Collection, purification and distribution of water  90 29 
452  Building of complete constructions or parts thereof; civil engineering  17 450 
502  Maintenance and repair of motor vehicles  1 53 
511  Wholesale on a fee or contract basis  1 259 
512  Wholesale of agricultural raw materials and live animals  2 18 
514  Wholesale of household goods  1 125 
524  Other retail sale of new goods in specialized stores  1 236 
526  Retail sale not in stores  3 17 
551  Hotels  1 115 
601  Transport via railways  1 0 
602  Other land transport  45 532 
632  Other supporting transport activities  6 9 
641  Post and courier activities  1 0 
643  Radio communications  2 5 
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Table A1 continued 
NACE 








644  Other radio communication related activity  1 0 
701  Real estate activities with own property  2 6 
702  Letting of own property  5 45 
703  Real estate activities on a fee or contract basis  6 20 
731  Research and exp. development on natural sciences and engineering  3 178 
742  Archit. and engineering activities and related technical consultancy  1 133 
743  Technical testing and analysis  2 5 
747  Industrial cleaning  1 2 
900  Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar activities  36 20 
921  Motion picture and video activities  3 4 
927  Other recreational activities  2 19 
Total    348 3,825
 
  18  
Discussion Papers published in 2009 
 
 
Judit KARSAI: The End of the Golden Age - The Developments of the 
Venture Capital and Private Equity Industry in Central and Eastern Europe. 
MT-DP. 2009/1 
András SIMONOVITS: When and How to Subsidize Tax-Favored Retirement 
Accounts? MT-DP.2009/2 
Mária CSANÁDI: The "Chinese Style Reforms" and the Hungarian "Goulash 
Communism". MT-DP. 2009/3 
Mária CSANÁDI: The Metamorphosis of the Communist Party:   
from Entity to System and from System towards an Entity. MT-DP. 2009/4 
Mária CSANÁDI – Hairong LAI – Ferenc GYURIS: Global Crisis and its 
Implications on the Political Transformation in China. MT-DP. 2009/5 
DARVAS Zsolt - SZAPÁRY György: Árszínvonal-konvergencia az új EU 
tagországokban: egy panel-regressziós modell eredményei. MT-DP. 2009/6 
KÜRTI Andrea - KOZAK Anita - SERES Antal - SZABÓ Márton: 
Mezőgazdasági kisárutermelők nagy kereskedelmi láncooknak történő 
beszállítása a nagyvevői igények alapján a zöldség-gyümölcs ágazatban. MT-
DP.2009/7  
András SIMONOVITS: Hungarian Pension System and its Reform. MT-
DP.2009/8  
Balázs MURAKÖZY - Gábor BÉKÉS: Temporary Trade. MT-DP. 2009/9  
Alan AHEARNE - Herbert BRÜCKER -  Zsolt DARVAS -  Jakob von 
WEIZSÄCKER:  
Cyclical Dimensions of Labour Mobility after EU Enlargement. MT-DP. 
2009/10 
Max GILLMAN - Michal KEJAK: Inflation, Investment and Growth: a Money 
and Banking Approach. MT-DP. 2009/11 
Max GILLMAN - Mark N. HARRIS: The Effect of Inflation on Growth: 
Evidence from a Panel of Transition Countries. MT-DP. 2009/12 
Zsolt DARVAS: Monetary Transmission in Three Central European 
Economies:  
Evidence from Time-Varying Coefficient Vector Autoregressions. MT-DP. 
2009/13 
Carlo ALTOMONTE - Gábor BÉKÉS: Trade Complexity and Productivity. 
MT-DP. 2009/14 
András SIMONOVITS: A Simple Model of   Tax-Favored Retirement 
Accounts. MT-DP. 2009/15  
Ádám SZENTPÉTERI - Álmos TELEGDY: Political Selection of Firms into 
Privatization Programs. Evidence from Romanian Comprehensive Data. 
MT-DP. 2009/16  
András SIMONOVITS: Pension Reforms in an Aging Society: A Fully 
Displayed Cohort Model. MT-DP. 2009/17  
VALENTINY Pál-KISS Károly Miklós: A nélkülözhetetlen eszközök 
értelmezése és a postai szolgáltatások. MT-DP. 2009/18
  19  
  20 
 
Gábor BÉKÉS  - Péter HARASZTOSI  - Balázs MURAKÖZY: Firms and 
Products in International Trade: Data and Patterns for Hungary. MT-DP. 
2009/19 
Judit KARSAI: Áldás vagy átok? A magántőke-befektetések hatása a 
gazdaságra.  
MT-DP. 2009/20 
László HALPERN–Balázs MURAKÖZY: Innovation, Productivity and 
Exports: the Case of Hungary. MT-DP. 2009/21 
Zsuzsa KAPITÁNY: Non-employment, Ill-being and Subjective Well-being. 
MT-DP. 2009/22  
Szilárd BENK-Max GILLMAN-Michal KEJAK: A Banking Explanation of the 
US Velocity of Money: 1919-2004. MT-DP. 2009/23  
Zsolt Darvas: The Impact of the Crisis o n  B u d g e t  P o l i c y  i n  C e n t r a l  a n d  
Eastern Europe. MT-DP. 2009/24  
Nemes Gusztáv: Gondolatok a vidékfejlesztési programok értékeléséről: 
Társadalmi tanulás a LEADER programban. MT-DP. 2009/25 
 
 
Discussion Papers are available at the website of Institute of Economics 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences: http://econ.core.hu 